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Drug smuggling into the United States has grown to epidemic pro-
portions during the last decade.1 The primary avenue for drug ship-
ment is the high seas.2 To preserve comity among nations, U.S. courts
t J.D. Candidate, University of Florida.
1. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that drug trafficking is a $64
billion industry. See THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE,
NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 5 (1979) [hereinafter NARCOTICS ESTIMATE]. More
than 33 million pounds of marijuana alone are illegally imported each year, and DEA data
indicate that drug smuggling into the country is increasing sharply. See id. at 31. Illegal
drugs in the United States generated $64 billion in retail sales in 1979, compared to $50
billion in 1978 and $48 billion in 1977. Domestic production, however, accounted for only
25% of the total retail sales in 1979, the same proportion as in 1978, reflecting the increase in
total drug importation. Id. at 5.
Due to the heavy flow of cocaine and marijuana from South America, Florida is the prime
smuggling gateway to the United States. Approximately 40% of all the cocaine and 30% of
all the marijuana imported move through that state each year, representing an estimated
retail value of $25 billion. Id. at 10. Some publications put the Florida figures even higher.
Time Magazine estimates that 70% of all marijuana and cocaine imported into the United
States passes through South Florida, making drug smuggling the region's major industry.
Kelly, Trouble in Paradise, TIME, Nov. 23, 1981, at 22, 22-23.
About 75% of the U.S. market supply of marijuana originates in Colombia. See NARCOT-
ICS ESTIMATE, supra, at 31. See also infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
The statistics used in this paper on the supply of drugs to the United States are taken
primarily from the Narcotics Intelligence Estimate (NIE), produced annually by the Na-
tional Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC). The NNICC was estab-
lished in 1978 to coordinate foreign and domestic narcotics intelligence at the federal level.
The present membership of the NNICC is as follows: United States Coast Guard; United
States Customs Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion; Immigration and Naturalization Service; Internal Revenue Service; National Institute
on Drug Abuse; Department of State; Department of the Treasury; White House. The NIE
is the most comprehensive and authoritative estimate available on the supply of illicit drugs
to the United States. Because drug trafficking is an illegal activity, there are few "hard"
statistics. Interview with Cornelius J. Dougherty, Public Information Officer for the Drug
Enforcement Administration, in Miami (June 20, 1982).
2. The high seas include all waters beyond the territorial seas of the United States and
beyond the territorial sea of any foreign nation. See 21 U.S.C. § 955b(b) (Supp. IV 1980);
United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22 (1969); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 868
(5th Cir. 1979). The extent of a nation's territorial boundaries is restricted by the interna-
tional law of the sea, which was to a large degree codified by the United Nations conference
at Geneva in 1958. The Conference produced four conventions: Convention on the High
Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force for
the United States Sept. 30, 1962); Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force for the
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seek to abide by principles of international law3 to obtain jurisdiction
over acts of trafficking committed aboard U.S.,4 stateless, 5 and foreign
vessels6 on the open seas. In the past, courts generally were able to
United States Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force for the United States June
10, 1964); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 139, T.I.A.S. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force for the
United States Mar. 20, 1966). For a further discussion of the Conventions, see M.
AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (3d ed. 1977). In ac-
cordance with these conventions, international law divides the navigable sea into three gen-
eral zones-internal waters, territorial sea, and high seas. Each zone is distinguished by the
degree of control the contiguous nation may exercise over it. Internal waters, such as rivers,
lakes, and canals, are within the land area of a nation and are subject to that nation's com-
plete sovereignty, as if they were part of the land. Beyond the seaward edge of a country lies
the territorial sea, in which a nation may exercise plenary authority but cannot deny the
right of innocent passage to foreign vessels. Although the territorial sea was defined in
Article 6 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, no boundary limit
was accepted. The width of the territorial sea, therefore, may vary from country to country.
The United States has long adhered to the widely accepted three mile limit. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1301(a)(2) (1976). See e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33-34 (1947); United
States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 677 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982). The high seas are areas outside the
territorial sea that are not subject to the sovereignty of any single nation. It is, however,
generally accepted that a coastal nation may exercise some limited control beyond its territo-
rial waters. For example, the United States exercises limited control for customs purposes
over waters which extend 12 nautical miles from the coast. 19 U.S.C. § 14016) (1976). The
United States also has limited control over an exclusive economic zone, which covers por-
tions of the continental shelf, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), and the fishery conservation zone,
which extends 200 nautical miles at sea. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1979). For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the three water divisions, see generally M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUB-
LIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962);
P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 75-112 (1927);
Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 56-59 (1977);
Note, Iigh on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches
at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REV. 725, 725 n.2 (1980).
A third United Nations convention on the law of the sea was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982. See Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, U.N. De. A/CONF.62/121, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) [hereinafter UN-
CLOS III]. Even if ratified, however, UNCLOS III will not significantly alter the relation-
ship between the three general zones of the navigable sea and national criminal jurisdiction.
Departing from the 1958 Conventions, supra, the new convention establishes a 12 nautical
mile limit for the territorial sea. Id. art. 3. In addition, it permits a nation to exercise within
24 nautical miles of its coast the control necessary to enforce its laws within its territory and
territorial sea. Id. art. 33. The new convention also reaffirms the doctrine of freedom of the
high seas for all nations. Id. arts. 87 & 89.
The United States has indicated that it will not sign UNCLOS III due to perceived defects
in its provisions regarding deep-sea mining. See Statement by the President on the Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 887 (July 12, 1982).
Approximately 60% of all marijuana imports are transported by sea. See NARCOTICS
ESTIMATE, supra note 1, at 39.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 38-46. The United States Supreme Court has ex-
pressed its clear intention to adhere to these jurisdictional principles of international law.
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
4. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text.
6. A foreign vessel is a vessel owned by residents of a foreign nation or sailing under a
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establish adequate jurisdictional grounds based on these principles.
Nevertheless, stringent substantive laws that required proof of a nexus
between the narcotics aboard the vessels and the United States ham-
pered the control of illegal drug importation.
7
Between 1970 and 1980 federal law did not proscribe mere posses-
sion of, or even possession with intent to distribute, marijuana or other
controlled substances beyond U.S. territorial waters.8 To convict the
crew of a drug-laden vessel seized by the Coast Guard on the high seas,
government prosecutors had the burden of proving either conspiracy or
attempt to import or distribute narcotics into the United States. 9 Be-
cause prosecutors were often unable to prove a direct connection be-
tween the drugs and the United States, smugglers captured on the high
seas were frequently set free to return to the drug trade.10
In 1980, Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 955a, the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act,I in an attempt to curb the flow of drugs into the coun-
try. 12 Section 955a expressly prohibits persons aboard any vessel sub-
ject to U.S. jurisdiction, while on the high seas, from possessing a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.' 3 Under this broader
prohibition, the government does not have to present any evidence es-
tablishing a nexus between the drugs discovered on board a captured
vessel and the United States.
14
This Comment examines law enforcement problems concerning ille-
gal drug importation from vessels on the high seas prior to the enact-
ment of section 955a.15 It then focuses on the changes made under the
1980 statute and discusses the application of section 955a to U.S., state-
less, and foreign vessels. 16 Particular emphasis is placed on the Elev-
enth Circuit courts' interpretation of section 955a, which indicates a
possible willingness to extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction to foreign ves-
foreign flag. Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas states that each nation "shall fix
the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships." Article 5 also requires that there
must be a "genuine link" between the country and the ship. See Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 2, art. 5. See also UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 91 (same conditions for
nationality of ships).
7. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 62-94 and accompanying text.
11. Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159, (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 955a (Supp. IV 1980)).
See United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1341. (S.D. Fla. 1981) (referring to
§ 955a as the Marijuana on the High Seas Act).
12. See infra notes 95-101.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 19-29 & 56-61.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
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sels on the high seas. 17 The Comment concludes with an analysis of the
issues raised by the application of section 955a to foreign vessels in
view of recognized international law principles governing extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction.18
I. Drug Enforcement Prior to Section 955a
The United States Coast Guard, the nation's primary maritime law
enforcement agency, is responsible for enforcing federal laws in U.S.
navigable waters and on the high seas.19 In 1890, a forerunner of the
Coast Guard first took steps against maritime drug smuggling by com-
batting the opium trade on the west coast of the United States.20 Some
thirty years later, the Coast Guard was involved in stopping rum-run-
ning ships during Prohibition. 2' As air travel developed, however,
17. See infra text accompanying notes 147-52.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 165-69.
19. 14 U.S.C. § 2 establishes the Coast Guard as the primary maritime agency charged
with the enforcement of federal laws at sea. It provides in relevant part:
The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal
laws on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion
of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. ....
14 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 89(a) provides that the Coast Guard is empowered to search
and seize any vessel on the high seas that is subject to the jurisdiction and operation of any
law of the United States:
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has
jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the
United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at
times go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's docu-
ments and papers, and examine, inspect and search the vessel and use all necessary
force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or
search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United States. . . has been commit-
ted, by any person, such person shall be arrested, or. . . such vessel or merchandise, or
both, shall be seized.
14 U.S.C. § 89a (1976). See United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (uphold-
ing the exercise of jurisdiction under § 89a to board and arrest persons on board a vessel on
the high seas). For a discussion of the law of search and seizure under § 89a, see generally
Carmichael, supra note 2; Note, Fifth Circuit Cases Concerning Search and Seizure upon the
High Seas: The Needfor a Limiting Doctrine, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 167 (1980); Note,
supra note 2.
20. H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 HousE REPORT].
The present day Coast Guard was established in 1915 by a consolidation of the Revenue
Cutter Service and the Life Saving Service. For an historical discussion of the statutory
powers of the Coast Guard and its predecessors, see Carmichael, supra note 2 at 65-75. See
also Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 513-31 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (discussing
origins of Coast Guard).
21. See 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. Following the introduction of Prohibi-
tion in 1919, a thriving liquor smuggling trade developed. Coast Guard seizures of rum-
running ships within territorial waters of the United States were usually upheld by the courts
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smugglers no longer depended primarily on sea transport.22 Neverthe-
less, marijuana smugglers returned to the sea in the 1970s in efforts to
increase their profits per haul by loading large quantities in the cargo
holds of ships.23
By 1978, the Coast Guard was reporting frequent drug-related ar-
rests along the southeastern coast of the United States up through the
Gulf of Mexico.24 Despite these seizures, the marijuana trade contin-
ued to prosper.25 Smugglers loaded marijuana into large vessels,
known as motherships, and travelled from Colombia through the Car-
ibbean to rendezvous points off the U.S. coast.26 Smaller and faster
"contact" boats were then used to unload the cargo and bring it ashore,
while the motherships waited outside U.S. territorial limits.27 In an
on the basis of customs legislation. To remove any remaining doubt, Congress enacted the
Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 318, ch. 356,42 Stat. 858 (codified in scattered sections of 18,
19, 29, 46 U.S.C.), authorizing the Coast Guard to board any vessel within 12 miles of the
coast. Some smugglers, naturally, escaped the operation of the customs laws by remaining
outside the 12 mile limit until they were able to come ashore undetected. For a more com-
prehensive discussion on smuggling during Prohibition, see Note, "Smoke on the Water ""
Coast Guard Authority to Seize Foreign Vessels Beyond the Contiguous Zone, 13 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 249, 256-66 (1980) [hereinafter Smoke on the Water].
22. See Note, Smoke on the Water, supra note 21, at 251.
23. Id. Besides the advantage of a greater profit per haul, ships are safer than small
planes for the smuggling of drugs. Id See NARCOTICS ESTIMATE, supra note 1, at 40.
In 1973, the Coast Guard cutter Dauntless seized from two vessels off the Florida coast
more than 3,000 pounds of marijuana, worth over a million dollars. This action signalled
the start of a new drug war at sea. See 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
24. See 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. According to the House Report, the
Coast Guard, in 1978, seized 167 vessels, made 867 arrests, and confiscated 3.5 million
pounds of contraband. Id. at 4.
25. See supra note 1.
26. See 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. Vessels utilized as motherships vary.
Motherships are often converted fishing trawlers, equipped with sophisticated radar and
jamming devices and designed to avoid Coast Guard detection. Smugglers also convert old
tankers or freighters by stripping out the ship's cabins to increase its carrying capacity for
marijuana. Interview with Andrew W. Anderson, Assistant Legal Officer, Seventh Coast
Guard District, in Miami (Aug. 10, 1982).
27. Due to the speed and number of these smaller craft, the Coast Guard can confiscate
only a small percentage of the illegal drugs brought ashore. The vast Florida coastline is an
ideal port of entry for drug-running vessels. The mothership usually maintains a position
from 50 to 200 miles at sea, far outside U.S. territorial and customs waters. On the more
distant hauls, contact boats are more likely to be luxury yachts or fishing vessels, which
shuttle the mothership's cargo to the mainland. On shorter hauls, smaller racing boats, often
referred to as "cigarette" boats, are used. These boats are capable of reaching speeds of 70
mph. Many of the cigarette boats are also equipped with devices such as radar scanners and
infra-red nightvision scopes to help them evade the Coast Guard. Interview with Andrew
W. Anderson, supra note 26; 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 3; Kelly, supra note 1, at
26. See Ficken, The 1935 ,nti-smuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Be-
yond the Contiguous Zone: An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv.
700 (1975); Smoke on the Water, supra note 21, at 251. The mothership-contact boat tech-
nique is predominant in seaborne drug shipments. Some motherships, however, make deliv-
eries to stash sites in remote cays in the Bahamas instead of rendezvousing with the contact
boats at sea for direct importation into the United States. See NARCOTICS ESTIMATE, supra
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attempt to cut off smugglers' supply lines, the Coast Guard began seiz-
ing motherships at various points in the Caribbean Sea.28 Because
these seizures took place outside U.S. territorial waters, they involved
both domestic and international law.
29
A. Jurisdictional Principles of International Law
Before the United States can prosecute persons apprehended aboard
drug-laden vessels on the high seas, its courts must establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendants and subject matter jurisdiction over the
crime the defendants allegedly have committed. Under international
law, all nations have an equal right to navigate on the world's oceans, 30
and the concept of "freedom of the seas," 31 dictates that no one nation
note 1, at 39. It is estimated that in 1979 the Coast Guard was, at best, seizing less than 10%
of the illegal drugs transported by sea into the United States. See 1979 House REPORT,
supra note 23, at 4.
28. Illegal drug shipments by sea from Colombia and other points in South America are
made through one of three Caribbean passages. The most direct course for motherships
heading north to Florida is through the Windward Passage between Cuba, Jamaica, and
Haiti. Alternate routes are through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico or the
Mona Passage between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Most other routes from
South America are too indirect for smugglers, resulting in a lengthy and costly voyage out
into the Atlantic Ocean. By intercepting ships in these three passages, the Coast Guard can
significantly limit its patrol area and increase the chances of capturing a drug-laden vessel.
Interview with Andrew W. Anderson, supra note 26. See NARCOTICS ESTIMATE, supra note
I, at 39 (map depicting common drug smuggling routes through the Caribbean).
29. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1979). See also supra note 2.
30. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 2. Article 2 states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part
of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions
laid down by these articles and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter
alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(I) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of interna-
tional law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other states in their exercise of the freedom on the high seas.
Id See also UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 87 (same).
31. The Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, is credited as the first to develop the freedom of the
seas as a principle of international law. See H. GRoTIus, DE Juu BELLI AC PACIS 190-91
(1646 ed. F. Kelsey trans. 1925). For centuries, the world's oceans have been considered not
subject to any right of ownership, sovereignty, or jurisdiction. Because the seas are incapa-
ble of division, it is believed that they are the property of all mankind. Consequently, no
one nation can claim to dictate laws for the high seas. See also Note, Law of the Sea.- The
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the United States and the Bahamas, 33 U.
FLA. L. REv. 207, 213-15 (1981).
The concept of freedom of the seas has long been recognized in U.S. law. In 1826, Justice
Story wrote for the Supreme Court in The Mariana Florla, that no country can appropriate a
superior or exclusive prerogative over the oceans. The Mariana Floria, 24 U.S. (I 1 Wheat.)
1, 43 (1826). Most nations today concede that the high seas are not subject to the exclusive
sovereignty of any nation. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 (1969). See supra
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can claim sovereignty over the waters extending beyond its own territo-
rial boundaries.32 Strict adherence to this principle would render the
United States powerless to prosecute drug traffickers arrested extrater-
ritorially. To overcome this problem, U.S. courts have relied on the
authority of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.33 According to the doctrine, a
defendant cannot challenge a court's personal jurisdiction on the
ground that the arrest was illegal.34 By extending the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine to arrests resulting from a breach of international law, U.S. courts
claim the right to assert in personam jurisdiction over individuals ap-
prehended on the high seas.
35
Despite the judiciary's self-imposed authority to exercise personal ju-
risdiction in these cases, neither Congress nor the courts has expressed
an intention to override international law with respect to subject matter
jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard vessels in extraterritorial
waters. 36 Generally, the freedom of the seas principle enjoins nations
from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over acts aboard such vessels.
International law recognizes a number of exceptions to the principle,
however, when the interests of a particular country outweigh the inter-
ests of the international community.37 U.S. courts have looked to four
of these exceptions-the nationality, objective-territorial, protective,
note 30; The Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 2 Dods. 210 (1817) (British acceptance of the
doctrine). For a more comprehensive examination of the concept of freedom of the seas, see
J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, 47-86 (6th ed. 1967).
32. Under early international custom, no nation was entitled to exercise control over the
sea beyond the range of a cannon shot, which was generally recognized to be about three
miles from the coast. See J. COLOMBOS, supra note 31, at 92.
33. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120 (1897); Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
34. See supra note 33. Under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, a court's power to try a person is
not impaired by the manner in which the person was brought within the court's physical
custody. The doctrine applies regardless of the citizenship of the person. See United States
v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975). The Ker-Frisbie doctrine has been criticized as
violating international law and due process. See Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or
,4rrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 241 (1934); Scott, Criminal
Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37
MINN. L. Rav. 91, 107 (1934).
35. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 873 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding personal
jurisdiction over defendant captured on high seas under Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
36. Under international law a country does not have jurisdiction to enforce one of its
laws unless it has jurisdiction to regulate the conduct in question. Rivard v. United States,
375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nor. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884
(1967); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 7(2)
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
37. Exceptions to the doctrine of freedom of the seas are based on the belief that a cer-
tain legal order must be maintained to prevent anarchy on the open seas. See generally 2 D.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 651 (1970); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 593
(8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955); Harvard Research on International Law (Pt. III), Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435, 445 (1935) [hereinafter 1935
Harvard Research].
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and universality principles-to justify subject matter jurisdiction over
narcotics offenses committed on U.S., stateless, and foreign vessels on
the high seas.
38
Under the nationality principle, a nation may prosecute its own citi-
zens for crimes defined under its penal code regardless of where they
are committed.39 A corollary principle, the law of the flag theory, al-
lows the United States to assert jurisdiction over acts aboard U.S. ves-
sels on the high seas.4° The principle is based on the notion that a ship
is deemed part of the territory whose flag it flies.41 It is also predicated
on the belief that the laws governing persons aboard vessels should not
vary with every change of waters.
42
The remaining three principles may provide grounds for jurisdiction
over crimes committed on stateless and foreign vessels on the high seas.
Unlike the law of the flag theory, they are not restricted to maritime
law and have been applied in a number of other contexts.43 The objec-
tive-territorial principle may give a nation jurisdiction to prosecute a
defendant for committing a crime outside its borders if the crime pro-
38. Seesupra note 3. Other principles of criminal jurisdiction recognized under interna-
tional law but not applicable to narcotics trafficking on the high seas are: the territoriality
principle (jurisdiction based on the place where the offense is committed); and the passive
personality principle (jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim). See Rivard v.
United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Groleau v. United States,
389 U.S. 884 (1967).
39. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953); United States v. Flores, 289
U.S. 137, 155 (1933); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United
States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Clark, Criminal Jurisdic-
tion over Merchant Vessels Engaged in International Trade, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoMM. 219, 220-
21 (1980).
40. It is unclear whether the law of the flag theory is an outgrowth of the nationality
principle or the territoriality principle. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122-23
(1923) (nationality principle); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.12
(l1th Cir. 1982) (nationality principle); United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715, 720
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (nationality principle); United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480, 488-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (nationality principle); RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §§ 28-29, 31. But see
Lauitzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953) (territoriality principle); United States v. Flo-
res, 289 U.S. 137, 155-57 (1933) (territoriality principle); Note, High Seas Narcotics Smug-
gling and Section 955,4 of Title 21: Overextension of the Protective Principle of International
Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 688, 695 & nn.43-44 (1982) (territoriality principle).
41. A country may exercise jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas under the law of
the flag theory if the vessel is registered in that country or it is owned by a person who
resides there. M. AKEHURST, supra note 2, at 104. See infra note 102. See, e.g., United
States v. Chaparra-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Del Sol, 679 F.2d
216 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668 (5th Cir.
1980).
42. M. AKEHURST, supra note 2, at 104. See supra note 40.
43. See generally M. AKEHURST, supra note 2, at 103-05.
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duced a detrimental effect within that country.44 Similarly, a nation
has jurisdiction under the protective principle of international law if
conduct outside its territory poses a potential threat to the nation's se-
curity or governmental functions.45
According to the universality principle, a country has jurisdiction
over crimes committed outside its territorial borders if the conduct at
issue is deemed universally outrageous.46 No specific nexus with the
country pressing prosecution is required. Recently a number of courts
in the United States have examined the universality principle as a pos-
sible basis for jurisdiction in narcotics cases,47 and have scrutinized
various international treaties to determine which particular offenses
constitute universal crimes. For example, the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas,48 to which the United States is a signatory, specifically
grants nations extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons engaged in
44. For example, a nation would have subject matter jurisdiction under this principle if
a person were to fire a bullet across its border and kill someone on the other side. M.
AKEHURST, supra note 2, at 104. Courts in the United States have long relied on the objec-
tive-territorial principle as a basis for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 622-24 (1927); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911);
United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. King, 552
F.2d 833, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Rivard v. United States,
375 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884
(1967); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). A conspiracy on the
high seas illegally to import drugs into the United States falls within the objective-territorial
principle despite the absence of an overt act within the United States. See United States v.
Gray, 659 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1981) (vessel seized on high seas 100 miles off Florida coast);
United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1980) (vessel seized on high seas off the
Yucatan Peninsula); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1980) (vessel
seized 70 miles from U.S. coast); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980) (vessel
seized nine miles from U.S. coast); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979)
(vessel seized 26 miles from U.S. coast); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.
1978) (vessel seized 200 miles from U.S. coast); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th"
Cir. 1978) (vessel seized 700 miles from U.S. coast).
45. See 1935 HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 37 at 543. See also United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); United States v.
Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631,
635 (D.P.R. 1978); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 489 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
Use of the protective principle historically has been restricted to crimes such as spying,
plots to overthrow the government, currency forgery, and false statements on visa applica-
tions. See AKEHURST, supra note 2, at 104. See also RFSTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 33 n. 1.
Only recently have courts applied the protective principle to the problem of drug smuggling.
In view of the size of the drug problem in the United States, these courts reason that unlaw-
ful importation of a controlled substance represents a threat to the security of the United
States. See United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978). For a discussion of the protective
principle in relation to drug smuggling, see Note, Drug Smuggling and the Protective Princi-
ple: .4 Journey into Uncharted Waters, 39 LA. L. REv. 1189 (1979).
46. M. AKEHURST, supra note 2, at 104-05; RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 34.
47. See United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n.16 (lth Cir. 1982);
United States v. Smith, No. 81-1278, slip op. (Ist Cir. June 8, 1982).
48. 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2. See also supra note 4.
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piracy aboard vessels on the high seas.49 Because the treaty also grants
nations the power to board ships engaged in slave trade in international
waters,50 some commentators contend that slavery also constitutes a
universal offense.5 1 The treaty, however, makes no mention of drug
trafficking.
Unlike the 1958 Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs52 specifically addressed the international drug problem.
The treaty's preamble calls for worldwide cooperation in controlling
narcotic drug abuse.53 Furthermore, the penal provisions governing il-
licit drug traffic grant prosecutorial authority to any signatory nation in
whose territory an offense was committed or an offender is found.5 4
The treaty fails, however, to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the universality principle. Because drug trafficking has never
been expressly condemned as a universal crime under international
law, courts have been reluctant to employ the exception.
55
B. Domestic Legislation
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 (Comprehensive Act)56 is the principal federal statute under
49. 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 19. Article 19 of the treaty
states:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of
pirates, and arrest the person and seize the property on board. The courts of the State
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed....
Id See also UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 105 (same); id. art. 100 (duty to cooperate in
repressing piracy).
50. 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 22. Article 22 permits a war-
ship of a nation, such as a Coast Guard vessel, to board a ship sailing under a foreign flag
for purposes of search and seizure when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting piracy
or slave trade. Id See also UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 105.
51. See Note, supra note 40, at 692 n.27.
52. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, open for signature March 30, 1961, 18
U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204. The agreement entered into force for the
United States on June 24, 1967. Id.
53. The preamble to the Convention states in relevant part:
Considering that effective measures against abuse or narcotic drugs require co-ordi-
nated and universal action,
Understanding that such universal action calls for international co-operation ....
Desiring to conclude a generally acceptable international convention replacing ex-
isting treaties on narcotic drugs... providing for continuous international co-opera-
tion and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives.
See id. preamble. See also id. art. 35.
54. See id. art. 36 (IV).
55. Apparently no court has used the universality principle to obtain jurisdiction over
drug smugglers arrested aboard vessels on the high seas.
56. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-803, 811-812, 821-
830, 841-852, 871-886, 901-904, 951-966 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter Comprehensive
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which drug offenders are prosecuted. The legislative intention of the
Comprehensive Act was to deal completely and consistently with
problems relating to possession and importation of drugs into the
United States.57 In drafting the Act, Congress, however, inadvertently
repealed 21 U.S.C. § 184(a), the provision that expressly prohibited
possession of a controlled substance aboard U.S. vessels on the high
seas, and failed to include any replacement provision.5 8 Therefore, the
Comprehensive Act prohibited possession of narcotics within U.S. ter-
ritorial waters, but did not proscribe possession on the high seas unless
there was evidence of conspiracy or attempt to import or distribute nar-
cotics into the United States.59 In the absence of such evidence, drug
traffickers often operated beyond the reach of U.S. law. Because of this
loophole, prosecutions of smugglers captured on the high seas often
were dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage for lack of evidence of
intent to distribute in this country.60 Consequently, even in instances
where the Coast Guard was able to confiscate illegal drugs aboard the
vessels, the government was often unable to meet the burden necessary
for prosecution.6
1
C. The Revolving Door
The inadequacy of the Comprehensive Act was clearly demonstrated
in United States v. Hayes.62 In Hayes, the defendants appealed their
conviction of attempted importation and possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute.63 The Coast Guard had boarded the defendants'
fishing vessel approximately 110 miles southeast of Puerto Rico and
confiscated thirteen tons of marijuana.64 Because the vessel was regis-
Act]. See also H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4566.
57. Id. at 4567. See S. REP. No. 613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
58. See 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 4. See also United States v. Riker, 670
F.2d 987, 988 (11th Cir. 1982).
59. See S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong. Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEwS 2785. See also 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 5.
60. See 125 Cong. Rec. 20,082-83 (1979) (comments of Congressman Biaggi).
61. Even in those cases that did proceed further than the early stages of prosecution,
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either attempted importation into the United
States or conspiracy was often impossible to obtain for trial. See S. REP. No. 613, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
62. 653 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 10. Defendants-appellants appealed their convictions of attempted importa-
tion of marijuana into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 and possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(i). Id.
64. Id. The Coast Guard cutter Gallatin, which made the stop, was under orders to
intercept any U.S. vessel under 200 feet in length to assure compliance with all U.S. laws.
Id.
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tered in the United States,65 the prosecution asserted extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction under the law of the flag theory. 66 The pros-
ecution further argued that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a con-
viction under the Comprehensive Act because the defendants admitted
their intent to distribute, even though distribution may have been in-
tended in a foreign country.67 The court upheld the conviction for at-
tempted importation,68 but ruled that under the prevailing federal
statute, possession of marijuana aboard a U.S. vessel on the high seas
with intent to distribute would not constitute a crime absent proof of
intent to distribute in the United States. 69 Thus, despite the otherwise
valid jurisdictional ground under the law of the flag theory,70 the legis-
lative loophole in the Comprehensive Act prevented the government
from securing a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.
7'
Similarly, prosecutions against crewmembers aboard stateless and
foreign vessels in international waters were successful only in instances
where clear proof existed to support a finding of conspiracy or intent to
distribute narcotics within the United States.72 For example, in United
States v. Caicedo-Asprilla,73 the court upheld the defendants' convic-
tions for conspiring to import marijuana into the United States and for
distributing with knowledge that it would be unlawfully imported into
the United States.74 In that case, the Coast Guard had boarded a
thirty-foot power boat, the Mermaid, in Florida inland waters and dis-
covered residue from marijuana cargo. 75 One of the crewmembers, af-
ter his arrest, confessed that he received the marijuana from a
65. Id See also infra note 104 and accompanying text.
66. 653 F.2d at 15. See also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
67. 653 F.2d at 12. The defendants stated at trial that they intended to distribute the
marijuana in Europe. Id. The U.S. attorney stated in his closing argument, "As long as you
have that marijuana in a piece of territory of the United States, even if that territory is
floating, you have committed the offense." Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 16. See supra note 63.
69. 653 F.2d at 15. Because Congress did not expressly provide that 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), which makes possession with intent to distribute a crime, applies extraterritori-
ally, the court ruled that the prosecution had to prove the intent was to distribute in the
United States. Id.
70. The court acknowledged that Congress has the power to make possession of a con-
trolled substance on a U.S. vessel on the high seas a crime under the law of flag theory. The
deciding issue, however, was that Congress did not intend to do so. Id.
71. Id. at 16.
72. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
73. 632 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 1164. The thirteen defendants were appealing their convictions under 21
U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 959(2), 963. Id.




mothership anchored in the Gulf of Mexico.76 A Coast Guard helicop-
ter later spotted a fishing boat, similar in description, anchored fifty-
two miles off the Florida coast.77 Upon boarding the vessel, the au-
thorities found more than 200 bales of marijuana and arrested the
crew. 78 The ship flew no flag and carried no documentation of its
registry.
79
The court based jurisdiction over the stateless vessel on the objective-
territorial principle, 80 reasoning that even though the illegal acts oc-
curred outside the country's territorial limits, they clearly had effects
within the United States. 81 Furthermore, the court upheld the criminal
conspiracy conviction on the basis of evidence that the defendants had
participated in a sophisticated smuggling operation and had carried out
their plan by transferring narcotics into the contact boat.82 Regarding
the distribution charge, the court ruled that the evidence showed con-
clusively that marijuana from Colombia was distributed to the contact
boat, the Mermaid, for importation into this country, satisfying the re-
quirements of the Comprehensive Act.
83
Apart from the decision in Caicedo-Asprilla, which found the requi-
site intent, successful prosecutions against drug smugglers on stateless
vessels were rare under the Comprehensive Act.84 The Act's language
also was an impediment to the government's attempts to apprehend
foreign vessels carrying controlled substances beyond U.S. territorial
limits. In United States v. Cadena,85 the court upheld a conviction for
conspiracy to import marijuana,86 but reversed a conviction for con-
spiracy to distribute within the United States.87 In Cadena, the Coast
Guard boarded a foreign freighter carrying a cargo of marijuana in
76. Id. The crew member stated that the mothership was located about 45 to 55 miles
off the Florida coast in the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
77. Id. at 1164-65.
78. Id. at- 1165.
79. Id. For an explanation of what constitutes a stateless vessel under international law,
see infra notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text. In Caicedo-Asprilla the word "Panama,"
was affixed beneath the name "Albazul" on the cabin of the mothership, indicating that the
vessel was of foreign registry. Another nameplate bearing a different name was also found,
however, which reduced the ship to a stateless status. 632 F.2d at 1165.
80. 632 F.2d at 1166. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
81. 632 F.2d at 1166.
82. Id. at 1166-67.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
85. 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 1266. The court upheld the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to import
marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 846.
87. Id. at 1266. The court reversed the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to distribute
marijuana in the United States under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Id. at 1256.
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international waters and arrested the foreign crewmembers. 88 The
seizure was the result of a two-month investigation that began after
federal agents in Florida were advised that a local party sought a boat
to rendezvous with a freighter on the high seas. The boat was to re-
ceive a large quantity of marijuana from the freighter and deliver the
shipment in Florida.8 9 Establishing jurisdiction under the objective-
territorial principle, 90 the court ruled that the government proved con-
spiracy to import through witnesses' testimony of the arrangements the
defendant made for the rendezvous.91 The court, however, did not find
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant aboard the
freighter knew of any distribution scheme within the United States.92
As these cases show, proof of intent to distribute in or conspiracy to
import into the United States was a difficult burden for prosecutors.
Occasional convictions for the lesser charge of attempted importation
had little deterrent effect on drug smugglers, as leaders of trafficking
organizations considered the government's limited success merely part
of the cost of doing business.93 Thus, under the restrictive language of
the Comprehensive Act, the Coast Guard was forced, for the most part,
to confine its war against the drug trade to areas within territorial
waters. 94
88. Id. at 1256. The seizure took place on the high seas about 200 miles off the Florida
coast. Id.
89. Id. Drug Enforcement Administration agents rendezvoused with the defendant's
vessel at sea. The Coast Guard cutter Dauntless was then called to the scene after the de-
fendants loaded 150 bails of marijuana onto the agent's boat. Id.
90. Id See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
91. 585 F.2d at 1265-66.
92. Id. at 1266. Because the prosecution could not establish that the defendant had
knowledge of the distribution scheme in the United States, he could not be convicted under
21 U.S.C. § 846. Id.
93. After chairing field hearings on Coast Guard drug enforcement efforts in the Carib-
bean and the Gulf of Mexico, Congressman Biaggi spoke before the House of Representa-
tives and described a typical high seas arrest:
I was present when the 95-foot Coast Guard patrol boat Cape Current. .. escorted the
pleasure vessel David to the Coast Guard base at Miami Beach. The David had been
seized on the high seas when it was found to contain over 2,500 pounds of marihuana.
Six crewmen were on board.
In a case like this, the marihuana is burned or shredded and the vessel is impounded.
The fate of the crew is more speculative. In the absence of evidence to prove conspiracy
to import-which is the usual case--they will go free. If they are of foreign nationality,
they are sent home at the expense of the U.S. Government. In either case, they will be
able to return to the drug trade within a short time. The present law is thus no deterrent
to repeat offenders.
125 CONG. REc. 20,082 (1979) (comments of Congressman Biaggi).
94. As a result, the Coast Guard was fighting a losing battle. Under the Comprehensive
Act, over 80% of U.S. citizens arrested on the high seas for drug smuggling by the Coast
Guard could not be successfully prosecuted. In addition, virtually all foreign smugglers
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II. Enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 955a
Responding to the critical omission in the Comprehensive Act and
further broadening the scope of federal narcotics laws, Congress en-
acted 21 U.S.C. § 955a in 1980. 95 In the specific wording of section
955a as well as in its legislative history, Congress expressed its clear
intention to authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction.96 Section 955a(a)
specifically prohibits any person on board a U.S. vessel or a vessel sub-
ject to U.S. jurisdiction on the high seas from knowingly or intention-
ally possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or
distribute.97 Section 955a(b) forbids U.S. citizens on board any vessel
to engage in illicit drug activities. 98 Thus, the statute criminalizes acts
of possession, manufacture, or distribution committed outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States.99 Section 955a requires no
arrested on the high seas were not only released, but were given a free trip back to their
home country. Id. at 6381 (comments of Congressman Murphy).
95. See supra note 11. The sudden increase of narcotics smuggling in the 1970s made
drug enforcement authorities acutely aware of the federal law's inadequacies pertaining to
the prosecution of crewmembers aboard U.S., stateless, and foreign vessels in international
waters. In 1977, the problem came to the attention of the House Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Navigation, which began hearings to determine how to remedy the loophole. On
March 1, 1979, H.R. 2538 (later codified as 21 U.S.C. § 955a) was introduced by Mario
Biaggi, Chair. Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation, Lester L. Wolff, Chair. House
Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Benjamin A. Gilman, Select Comm., John
M. Murphy, Chair. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, together with more than
fifty co-sponsors. See 1979 House REPORT, supra note 20, at 6.
96. Federal statutes are generally presumed to apply only within U.S. territory, unless
Congress clearly states its intention to give the statute extraterritorial effect or if it is appar-
ent that the statute's purpose would be defeated unless applied extraterritorially. See United
States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Burke, No. 82-0063
(D.P.R. June 10, 1982); RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 38, n.l.
The drafters of section 955a make it clear throughout the legislative record that they in-
tend for the act to apply extraterritorially. See 1979 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 20. See also
125 CONG. REc. 20,082-84 (1979) (statement of Congressman Biaggi). Section 955a(h)
states, "This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 21 U.S.C. § 955a(h)
(Supp. IV 1980). But see infra note 143 (Congress did not intend that section 955a be ap-
plied extraterritorially in violation of international law). Congress is granted the power to
legislative extraterritoriaUy by Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitu-
tion, which authorizes Congress "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the High Seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
97. Section 955a(a) states:
(a) It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas, to know-
ingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufac-
ture or distribute, a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
98. Section 955a(b) provides: "It is unlawful for a citizen of the United States on board
any vessel to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent
to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sustance." 21 U.S.C. § 955a(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
99. Section 955a also criminalizes the manufacture or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute, on board any vessel within
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proof of a connection to this country at all; proof of intent to distribute
anywhere in the world is sufficient for conviction. Furthermore, under
the statutory scheme, intent may be inferred from the mere presence of
a controlled substance in an amount greater than that associated with
normal consumption.lo ° As a result, section 955a effectively closes the
previous statutory loophole that existed under the Comprehensive Act.
The only remaining question is whether the United States can, consis-
tent with international law, prosecute smugglers aboard any kind of
vessel on the high seas under section 955a.10
A. Prosecuting Persons Aboard U.S. Vessels
Section 955b defines a U.S. vessel as a vessel registered in the United
States or one owned in whole or in part by a U.S. citizen.10 2 In United
States v. Riker,10 3 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendants' convic-
tions under section 955a for possession with intent to distribute mari-
juana while aboard a U.S. vessel.' 4 In that case, the Coast Guard
boarded the Restless, a sloop registered in the United States, which had
been travelling approximately twenty miles northwest of Bimini.
0 5
They found fifty-five bales of marijuana on board and arrested the
U.S. customs waters. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(c) (1980). It is recognized under international law
that a nation may exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts committed within its customs wa-
ters. See supra note 2. See also Convention on the Territorial Sea and Continguous Zone,
supra note 2, art. 24.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir. 1978), af§'d, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane);
United States v. Perry, 480 F.2d 147, 148 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d
1035 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972).
101. For a governmental view of the possible jurisdictional problems under § 955a, see
Raskin, The New Federal Statute on a High Seas Seizure-A Governmental View, FLA. B.J.,
Feb. 1982, at 168. See also Ramirez, The New Federal Statute on High Seas Seizures-A
Defense View, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1982, at 69 (examination of the jurisdictional issues under
§ 955a from the defense perspective).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(c) (1980). The section reads:
(c) "Vessel of the United States" means any vessel documented under the laws of
the United States, or numbered as provided by the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, as
amended, or owned in whole or in part by the United States .. . or any State, Terri-
tory, District, Commonwealth, or possession thereof, unless the vessel has been granted
nationality by a foreign nation in accordance with article 5 of the Convention on the
High Seas, 1958.
Id. Section 911(2) of Title 46 of the United States Code defines the term "documented" as
meaning "registered or enrolled or licensed under the laws of the United States, whether
permanently or temporarily." 46 U.S.C. § 911(2) (1920). See United States v. Newball, 524
F. Supp. 715, 718-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing what is a vessel of the United States). See
also United States v. Julio-Diaz, 678 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. 670 F.2d 987 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
104. Id.
105. Id. The Restless was traveling at slow speed on a heading that would have taken it




The defendants argued that because the ship neither originated from
nor was destined for a U.S. port, their activity aboard the vessel on the
high seas was beyond the reach of U.S. law.I0 7 Exercising jurisdiction
under the law of the flag theory,108 the court stated that the United
States had authority to define and punish criminal offenses aboard ship
just as it has on U.S. territory. 1°9 According to the court, the only re-
maining issue was whether Congress, in enacting section 955a, in-
tended to exercise that authority." 0  The court scrutinized section
955a's legislative history and found that it expressed a congressional
desire to prevent drug traffickers from further evading U.S. law
through statutory oversight."' In addition, the court examined the
statute's specific wording to determine its intended scope. 12 It ruled
that Congress' enactment of section 955a banished doubt that the
United States may sanction extraterritorial acts of narcotics possession
aboard U.S. vessels.
13
B. Applying Section 955a to Crewmembers Aboard Stateless Vessels
Prior to the enactment of section 955a, federal courts upheld U.S.
jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas," 4 but only upon a
showing that the vessel was involved in illegal activity tending to have
an effect in this country. 1 5 Section 955a expressly extends subject mat-
106. Id. at 988.
107. Id. The defendants contended that Congress lacked the power to proscribe the
conduct for which they were charged and that, therefore, the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to punish them. Id.
108. Id See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
109. 670 F.2d at 988. As authority, the court cited Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585.
(1953); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1933); United States v. Reagan, 453
F.2d 165, 170 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946 (1972).
110. 670 F.2d at 988.
111. Id. The court determined that the primary purpose behind the passage of section
955a was to close the loophole that had hampered law enforcement efforts since 1970. Id.
For the legislative history of section 955a, see generally supra notes 95-101; 1979 HousE
REPORT, supra note 20.
112. 670 F.2d at 988. See also supra note 97.
113. 670 F.2d at 988. TheRiker court concluded that Congress intended section 955a to
apply extraterritorially. Id. Since the Riker decision, the Eleventh Circuit has upheld juris-
diction over U.S. vessels on the high seas under section 955a. See United States v. Del Sol,
679 F.2d 216, 217 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Riker as precedent); United States v. Julio-Diaz,
678 F.2d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Riker as precedent); United States v. Liles, 670
F.2d 989, 990 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Riker as precedent).
114. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
115. Id See, e.g., United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
Monroy, 614 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); United States v. Domin-
guez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. May-May, 470 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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ter jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard stateless vessels on the
high seas without proof of a nexus between the alleged crime and the
United States.1 6 According to the statute, a stateless vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States is one which does not sail under
the flag of any nation" 7 or sails under the flags of two or more nations
to hide its true identity."18
In United States v. Angola," 9 the court examined the validity of as-
serting extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons aboard stateless vessels
charged with violating section 955a. Coast Guard officials boarded a
stateless vessel located approximately 350 miles from the United
States' 20 and apprehended foreign crewmembers for possession of ma-
rijuana with intent to distribute.' 21 The defendants argued that the
claim of subject matter jurisdiction over the acts of foreign nationals
aboard stateless vessels was unconstitutional when those acts had no
intended effect in the United States. 22 Rejecting this argument, the
court stated that the protective principle supports jurisdiction even
when an activity the United States seeks to regulate has only a poten-
tially adverse effect on the nation.123 Thus, proof of an actual harmful
effect was unnecessary.
According to the Angola court, Congress reasonably considered the
growing drug problem to have a potentially harmful effect on the
United States. 24 The court acknowledged that the crew aboard the
seized mothership may not have had the specific intent to import mari-
juana into the country. Nevertheless, the probability that the drugs
would be transferred to smaller boats planning to enter the United
States was deemed critical.' 25 Hence, the court concluded that the ac-
116. See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. IV 1980). According to 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d):
"'Vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States' includes a vessel without nationality
or a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of
article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958." 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
See also UNCLOS IlI, supra note 2, art. 92 (same).
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 955(b)(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
118. See supra note 116. Paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, to which section 955b(d) refers, states: "A ship which sails under the flags of two or
more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in
question with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without national-
ity." See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 6. See also UNCLOS III, supra
note 2, art. 92 (same).
119. 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
120. The vessel was seized just west of the Bahamian island of San Salvador. Id. at 936.
121. Id. at 935.
122. Id. at 934.
123. Id. at 935.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 936. The court noted this was not a case where a stateless vessel was stopped




tivity aboard the mothership posed a threat to this country and justified
the assertion of jurisdiction.
126
Despite this ruling, the court's reasoning indicates that the protective
principle as a jurisdictional basis for prosecution may be limited. Al-
though the defendants inAngola were charged under section 955a, the
court based its decision on proof of a sufficient connection between the
crime and the United States, similar to that required under prior law.
It is unlikely, therefore, that the protective principle would have been
applied without the establishment of a nexus. Thus the case cannot be
said to have addressed directly the general jurisdictional questions
posed by acts aboard stateless vessels.
C. The Marino-Garcia Decision
To avoid opening the door to another statutory loophole with regard
to stateless vessels, the Eleventh Circuit circumvented the jurisdictional
issue completely in United States v. Marino-Garcia.27 In Marino-Gar-
cia, Coast Guard officials boarded a stateless vessel sixty-five miles off
the west coast of Cuba and 300 miles from Florida, and discovered
approximately 57,000 pounds of marijuana.128 There was no evidence
that the contraband was intended for the United States. 29 Neverthe-
less, the nine crewmembers aboard, all foreign nationals, were arrested
and charged with conspiracy to possess marijuana and possession with
intent to distribute.' 30 The defendants appealed on the ground that the
court's assertion of jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas,
absent proof of a nexus with the United States, violated international
law.' 3 '
drug smugglers intending to pick up marijuana for distribution in the United States. In
effect, theAngola court established a nexus between the vessel and the United States as was
required prior to the enactment of § 955a. Id.
126. See id. The defendants also argued that foreign nationals cannot be held to notice
that their actions on the high seas might violate U.S. law. The court acknowledged that the
defendants may not have been aware of the specific statute involved. Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that persons travelling aboard stateless vessels are presumed to know they are sub-
ject to U.S. jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction of other nations. .rd. at 935. For a similar
discussion concerning notice to foreign nationals, see United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679
F.2d 1373, 1384 n.19 (1lth Cir. 1982). See also infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
127. 679 F.2d 1373 (1lth Cir. 1982).
128. Id. at 1378. The case is actually a consolidation of two separate appeals. The facts,
however, are substantially the same. In the companion case, United States v. Cassalins-Guz-
man, No. 82-5284, the Coast Guard encountered a stateless vessel on the high seas also in
the vicinity of Cuba. Upon boarding for verification of the ship's registration, Coast Guard
officials discovered approximately 20,000 pounds of marijuana. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1379. The defendants argued that the court does not have subject matter
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In upholding the conviction, the court explicitly rejected the kind of
nexus analysis that the Angola court implicitly had employed 132 and
held that in regard to stateless vessels, proof of a connection between
the narcotics and the United States is not required for a conviction.
133
The court emphasized that stateless vessels have no internationally rec-
ognized right to navigate freely on the high seas.134 Terming such ships
"floating sanctuaries from authority," the court added that these vessels
constitute a potential threat to navigational order and stability on the
high seas.135 The court concluded that international law permits any
nation to subject stateless vessels on the high seas to its jurisdiction,
because the assertion of jurisdiction would not interfere with the affairs
of another sovereign nation. 36 Proof of a nexus to the United States
was held unnecessary because jurisdiction existed solely as a conse-
quence of the vessel's status as stateless. 37 Such status subjected the
vessel to the laws of all nations proscribing certain activities aboard
flagless vessels, and subjected those persons aboard to prosecution. 38
The court also rejected the defendants' contention that section 955a
was fundamentally unfair because it subjected crewmembers aboard a
foreign ship en route to a foreign country to criminal sanctions without
notice. 39 The crewmembers were charged with a general understand-
ing of international law' 4° and held that persons aboard flagless vessels
engaging in illegal activity in international waters had constructive no-
jurisdiction over stateless vessels absent proof of a nexus between the vessel and the United
States. Id.
The legislative history of section 955a indicates that it was the intent of Congress to extend
U.S. jurisdiction under section 955a only to the maximum permitted under international
law. See 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 11; 125 CONG. REc. 20,083 (statement by
Congressman McCloskey emphasizing that section 955a is to be used "to the broadest extent
possible under international law"). See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
132. 679 F.2d at 1377 n.l. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (Angola).
133. 679 F.2d at 1377.
134. Id. at 1382. See also Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 6; UNCLOS
III, supra note 2, art. 92; United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. May-May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1979). See generall H. MEYERS, THE
NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 318 (1967); M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 2, at 1804
(1962); 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1968).
135. 679 F.2d at 1382.
136. Id. at 1383. See also United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940
(1980); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979).
137. 679 F.2d at 1383.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1384 n.19.
140. Id. The court reasoned that in light of the recent worldwide concern for drug traf-
ficking, the defendants should have been on notice that the United States, or any other
nation, may subject stateless vessels engaged in such activities to its jurisdiction. Id.
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tice that they would be subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction.141
III. Examining Section 955a's Application to Foreign Persons
Aboard Foreign Vessels
While section 955a expressly provides for criminal prosecution of all
persons aboard U.S. and stateless vessels, the statute has no corre-
sponding provision concerning foreign vessels.1 42  Although
crewmembers aboard foreign vessels usually are foreign nationals, 43
section 955a(b) only prohibits U.S. citizens on board any vessel from
engaging in acts of illegal possession, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances. 144 Thus, on its face, the statute seems to pre-
clude prosecution of foreign citizens traveling on foreign vessels on the
high seas. 1
45
Despite the legislative omission, the Eleventh Circuit in dicta has
conveyed conflicting signals about its willingness to apply section 955a
to all persons aboard foreign vessels. In Marino-Garcia, for example,
the court intimated that principles of international law would forbid
the automatic application of the statute to all members of the crews of
foreign vessels. 146 In United States v. Glen-A rchila,147 however, the
court implied a different result. After reviewing a Coast Guard seizure
of a foreign vessel under the prior federal statute that required proof of
a nexus with the United States, the court upheld the conviction of cer-
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 98-100.
143. Interview with Andrew.W. Anderson, supra note 26. See also 1979 HOUSE REPORT
supra note 20, at 3.
144. See supra note 99.
145. In proceedings before the House of Representatives, one supporter of section 955a
indicated that it was his belief that the United States could not exercise jurisdiction over
foreign citizens on foreign flag vessels unless an intent to import into the United States could
be shown or the flag state gives its concurrence. See 125 CONG. REc. 20,083 (statements of
Congressman McCloskey). It is recognized that international law must give way when Con-
gress expresses its clear intention to violate it. See United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d
363, 371-72; United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa.
1980). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §§ 3(3), 145(1). The drafters of section 955a,
however, expressed their intention to adhere to international law, not to disregard it. In
view of this legislative commitment, the courts appear to have no legitimate authority over
foreign citizens aboard foreign vessels on the high seas absent an internationally recognized
basis for jurisdiction. See S. Rep., supra note 59, at 2; U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1980, at 2785. See also 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
146. The court asserted that the "restrictions on the right to assert jurisdiction overfor-
eign vessels on the high seas and the concomitant exceptions have no applicability in con-
nection with stateless vessels." 679 F.2d at 1382 (emphasis added). See supra notes 136-38
and accompanying text.
147. 677 F.2d 809 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (British vessel, loaded with 30,000 pounds of mari-
juana, seized 20 miles off the Florida coast).
379
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
tain foreign members of the crew, in part because the seizure of the
vessel within twenty miles of the Florida coast permitted the reasonable
inference that the narcotics seized were intended for importation into
the United States. 14 The court noted, however, that section 955a had
eliminated the need to prove that the United States was the intended
destination of the controlled substance. 149 Thus, the opinion could be
read to imply that had the seizure taken place after the enactment of
the new statute, proof of a nexus with the United States would not have
been necessary to sustain the convictions.
50
A. The Jurisdictional Problem
The fundamental difficulty with the automatic application of section
955a to foreign crewmembers aboard foreign vessels is that interna-
tional law provides no basis for the assertion of subject matter jurisdic-
tion absent proof of a nexus between the criminal behavior and the
United States. Unlike unprotected stateless vessels, foreign vessels on
the open seas are governed by the laws of their flag states. Before a
court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over crimes allegedly com-
mitted by foreign nationals on these vessels, one of the jurisdictional
principles of international law should be satisfied.' 5' None of these
principles apply automatically, however. The nationality principle au-
thorizes nations to exert jurisdiction over their own citizens aboard any
vessel and prevents U.S. citizens engaged in drug smuggling from elud-
ing U.S. law by sailing on foreign vessels. Through its corollary, the
law of the flag theory, all persons aboard U.S. vessels are subject to
U.S. jurisdiction. The nationality principle is clearly inapplicable to
foreign nationals aboard foreign vessels. Furthermore, unless proof of
a connection between the foreign vessel and the United States can be
established, neither the objective-territorial nor the protective principle
can be used as a basis for jurisdiction. 52
148. Id. at 813-14.
149. See id. at 814 n.8.
150. Id. The seizure occurred in 1979. Id. at 812. Section 955a was enacted in 1980.
See supra note 11.
151. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
152. Under the objective-territorial principle, the United States may assert jurisdiction
over any vessel engaged in illegal activity intended to have an effect within its borders. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text. While the protective principle does not require a
criminal effect inside the United States, a potential threat to the security or governmental
functions of the nation must exist before it may be applied. Thus, some nexus with the
nation pressing prosecution is required. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. See
United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (unlawful importation of drugs
represents a threat to the security of the United States). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note
36, § 33; Note, supra note 40, at 714.
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B. App ying the Universality Principle to Foreign Vessels
Constrained by these clear limitations on three of the available juris-
dictional principles, courts have looked to the fourth, the universality
principle, 153 which requires no proof of a nexus. According to the
court in Marino-Garcia, there is a growing consensus among nations to
make drug trafficking a universally prohibited crime.154 Although the
United States favors such a classification,1 55 it is unlikely that an inter-
national agreement can be achieved. For example, the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs calls only for cooperation among na-
tions to control their own citizens engaging in narcotics trafficking, but
has yet to be approved by the number of countries required for its entry
into force.' 56 As a result, it is doubtful that a treaty attempting to es-
tablish drug smuggling as a universal crime would receive support at
the present time.
157
C. Lack of Notice to Foreign Citizens Aboard Foreign Vessels
A collateral problem facing the courts concerns whether foreign citi-
zens aboard foreign vessels in international waters can be held to notice
of section 955a.158 The Marino-Garcia court imputed constructive no-
tice of U.S. law to crewmembers of stateless vessels, reasoning that be-
cause these vessels do not sail under the laws of a sovereign nation,
they are subject to the jurisdiction of any nation. 59 Crewmembers
should, therefore, be charged with knowledge of their exposure to other
nations' maritime laws.1 60 The same reasoning, however, cannot be ap-
plied to foreign citizens aboard foreign vessels on the high seas, be-
cause they sail under the protection of their flag state.' 6' Crews aboard
these vessels are subject to their own country's laws under the national-
153. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
154. 679 F.2d at 1382 n.16.
155. See infra notes 164-66.
156. 679 F.2d at 1382 n.16.
157. One commentator summarized the drug smuggling problem in the following man-
ner. "Suppression of international drug traffic is in many ways analogous to the pursuance
of peace: all states profess it as a common goal, but there exist wide differences of opinion
on the proper means of securing it." See Ficken, supra note 27, at 727.
158. 679 F.2d at 1384 n.19. See also United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715, 720
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (court rejection of argument that § 955b(b) is so vague that it does not give
fair notice to the ordinary person and thus violates the due process clause of the fifth
amendment).
159. 679 F.2d at 1384 n.19.
160. Id.
161. Foreign crewmembers could argue that it is-fundamentally unfair to presume that
non-U.S. citizens on board a foreign vessel en route to a foreign country had notice of
§ 955a. See id.
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ity principle. 162 In accordance with international law, other nations
must defer to the flag state's right of exclusive sovereignty over its ves-
sels.163 Consequently, any attempt by the United States to apply sec-
tion 955a to foreign nationals aboard foreign vessels in extraterritorial
waters would arguably violate international law.16
Conclusion
Although section 955a remedied the loophole that existed under the
Comprehensive Act, it is not a cure-all provision. Because the statute
makes no reference to illegal acts by foreign citizens aboard foreign
vessels, a literal reading places such persons beyond the scope of the
Act.
Nevertheless, past law enforcement practices clearly indicate the
government's desire to apprehend foreign smugglers carrying contra-
band aboard foreign vessels, in addition to those aboard U.S. and state-
less vessels.1 65 In an effort to further Congress' goal of halting drug
importation, the Eleventh Circuit has implied that section 955a extends
to all persons aboard foreign vessels, rather than just to U.S. citizens.
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account the jurisdic-
tional problems associated with foreign vessels on the high seas. The
elimination of the nexus requirement under section 955a substantially
altered the relationship between jurisdictional and substantive law as it
pertained to foreign nationals aboard foreign vessels. Without evi-
dence of a nexus, neither the objective-territorial nor the protective
principle can be applied.1 66 Consequently, the universality principle,
which requires no proof of a nexus, appears to be the only viable basis
for jurisdiction over foreign nationals engaging in drug trafficking
aboard foreign vessels in violation of section 955a, unless prosecutors
162. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 30-32 and ac-
companying text.
163. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 6; UNCLOS III, supra note 2,
art. 92.
164. See id. A violation of international law can be avoided when foreign nationals on
board foreign vessels on the high seas are prosecuted under § 955a(a) if (I) a nexus to the
United States can be shown, (2) the flag state expressly concurs, possibly through treaty, to
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, or (3) drug trafficking is internationally recognized as a
universal crime.
165. For examples of cases that involve federal prosecutions against foreigners on for-
eign vessels, see United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Postal,
589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); Rivard
v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
166. See supra note 149.
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are able to discharge the difficult burden of establishing a nexus be-
tween the narcotics and the United States.
Although past international conventions have called for global coop-
eration in suppressing the illegal drug trade, 167 no treaty yet has ele-
vated narcotics smuggling to a universal crime. The recent concern
over increases in drug smuggling may provoke the international com-
munity to classify trafficking as a universal offense. 168 Until worldwide
agreement is reached, 69 U.S. courts face a dilemma: either they apply
section 955a without a jurisdictional basis and in apparent violation of
international law, or they allow the high seas to remain a sanctuary for
foreign drug traffickers aboard foreign vessels.
167. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. See also Convention for the Sup-
pression of llicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, open for signature June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S.
299, 198 U.N.T.S. 299 (providing that countries make punishable the possession, distribu-
tion and importation of narcotics). The United States is not a party to this agreement. See
TREATIES IN FORCE 315-18 (1981). For a discussion on international agreements involving
drug trafficking, see generally Noll, International Treaties and the Control of Drug Use and
Abuse, 6 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBLEMS 17 (1977).
168. The United States recently demonstrated its commitment to halt drug trafficking on
the high seas by creating a special task force assigned to south Florida, using mainly Navy
personnel and equipment, to aid the Coast Guard in its efforts. See Miami Herald, May 29,
1982, § A, at 1, coL 3.
169. UNCLOS III, like the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, see supra note 52,
calls for international cooperation in the suppression of drug trafficking. See UNCLOS III,
supra note 2, art. 108. The new convention, therefore, is also unlikely to cause the elevation
of drug trafficking to the status of a universal crime. See supra notes 52-55 and accompany-
ing text.
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